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ARTICLE
RETHINKING TWELFTH-CENTURY VIRTUE ETHICS:
THE CONTRIBUTION OF HELOISE
Sandrine Berges
Twelfth-century ethics is commonly thought of as following a stoic
inﬂuence rather than an Aristotelian one. It is also assumed that these
two schools are widely different, in particular with regards to the
social aspect of the virtuous life. In this paper I argue that this picture
is misleading and that Heloise of Argenteuil recognized that stoic
ethics did not entail isolation but could be played out in a social
context. I argue that her philosophical contribution does not end there,
but that she departs from both the stoics and her teacher, Abelard, in
her defence of the ideal of moderation. By insisting that virtue must
strike a mean between two extremes, she shows that Aristotelian virtue
ethics were present in the intellectual life of the twelfth century.
KEYWORDS: Heloise; virtue ethics; Seneca; Abelard; Aristotle
1. STOIC OR ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS?1
A common picture ofmedieval ethical writings is that virtue ethics aswe know
it, i.e. Aristotelian virtue ethics, did not ﬁnd expression in the writings of philo-
sophers beforeAquinas.2 Thinkers of the TwelfthCenturywere inﬂuenced by the
Stoics more than Aristotle and this often meant that their ethical thought was
focused on the interior world and the bringing of one’s soul in line with God’s
order. Participation in the activity of one’s moral or political community was
not encouraged, but instead, the virtuous person was supposed to build a
closed, well-ordered interior world along the lines of Stoic recommendations.
There are really two claims here, equally disputable. The ﬁrst is that the
1I would like to thank the following people for their help in putting this paper together: James
Alexander, Paul Kimball, Lars Vinx, Bill Wringe, for their comments, Lucas Thorpe and the
audience at the Bogazici philosophy seminar where I presented a version of this paper, Karl
Ubl for help in getting hold of some elusive texts for me, and ﬁnally the editors and two anon-
ymous referees for the British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
2MacIntyre makes this claim in his After Virtue, 168–9. Although MacIntyre is not a medieval
historian, this particular point is discussed in Nederman ‘Beyond Stoicism and Aristotelian-
ism’ as signiﬁcant.
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authors of the twelfth century had insufﬁcient access to Aristotle’s text so that
their ethical thoughts could not possibly be inﬂuenced by his. The second is
that Stoic ethics are so unlike Aristotelian ethics that they are not recognizable
aswhatwe nowcall virtue ethics. Both claims havebeen challenged.CaryNeder-
man in his several writings on the topic has made a case that the writings of Aris-
totle that were accessible to twelfth-century readers contained enough of his
ethical thought that its readers would both be impressed by the importance of
the theory and be able to understand its contents and use them in their own writ-
ings.Nederman argues that one twelfth-centurywriter in particular, Johnof Salis-
bury, produced ethical writings that were Aristotelian in the sense that they
emphasized the importance of the mean and the avoidance of excess in virtue,
as well as the idea that virtue is a ﬁrm state of character acquired through
habit.3 However, Nederman thought John was the exception, rather than the
rule, and that a lot of twelfth-century ethicswasmostly based onStoic principles.4
In this paper I want to argue that John of Salisbury was not the only twelfth-
century thinker to develop Aristotelian ethical arguments, but that another
thinker, twenty years older than John, got there ﬁrst. That thinker is Heloise of
Argenteuil, a highly educated, powerful abbess who was taught by Abelard
and later became his wife (until circumstances forced them apart). I do not
claim that Heloise gained such great insight from the writings of Aristotle that
were available that she would have been able to construct her own Aristotelian
ethical systembased on a few lines from theCategories, but that plenty of ethical
insight was available in the authors we know that she did read – because she
quotes them – such as Seneca and Cicero.5 Those authors tended to share a lot
morewith their Greek predecessors than is sometimes recognized.6 In particular,
the supposed contrast between Stoic isolationism and Aristotle’s emphasis on
3Nederman and Brickmann, ‘Aristotelianism in Policraticus’, 228. See also Nederman,
‘Beyond Stoicism and Aristotelianism’.
4Nederman argues that MacIntyre ‘captures in brief compass a pronounced tendency implicit
in a wide range of scholarship: the view that philosophical ethics during the High Middle Ages
was bifurcated between Abelardian (Stoic/Christian) and Aristotelian understandings of
natural virtue’, pp. 175–6. See also Lapidge, The Stoic Inheritance and Wieland, ‘The Recep-
tion of Aristotle’s Ethics’, 657–9.
5See Bejczy, The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages, 71, for the claim that Cicero and Seneca
were the most widely read authors of the twelfth century, and Bejczy’s introduction to his and
Nederman’s ‘Beyond Stoicism and Aristotelianism’, 2, for the claim that Cicero’s De Inven-
tione was one of the most quoted ancient sources between the twelfth and the ﬁfteenth century,
along with Macrobius’s Commentary on the Somnium Scipionis. As to Heloise’s acquaintance
with Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius, one need no other evidence than the fact that she quotes it
twice in three letters: 40.1 on p. 51 and 24.1 on p. 72 in Levitan, Abelard and Heloise.
6In attributing some Aristotelian beliefs to these authors I will follow A.A. Long ‘Greek Ethics
after MacIntyre’who argues that it is a mistake to understand Stoicism as belonging to a differ-
ent ethical tradition from Aristotle because both take moral teleology, the idea that there is a
human essence and that the good life means developing according to that essence, as their start-
ing point, and both use very similar accounts of virtue, i.e. that which enables us to develop
according to our nature or essence. See also for example many of the articles in Sihvola and
Engberg-Pedersen, The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy.
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the role of the community for individual ﬂourishing is clearly mistaken. The
Stoics, on the whole, did believe that a virtuous life was best lived in a commu-
nity, and that the sort of character building required for virtue was helped by the
development of good relationships with family, friends, neighbours and depen-
dents.7 Secondlywhen it comes to theRomanphilosophers,whowere read in the
period we are discussing, it is even less plausible to insist that their views were
radically different from Aristotle’s. As politicians or political advisors them-
selves, they would have particularly valued the kind of teaching that aimed at
better politics. Thirdly it is in any case quite clear that the Stoics did not turn
their back on community involvement from the fact that they defended cosmo-
politanism, i.e. the view that we each owe our moral allegiance to the entire
human race. Moral allegiance is not best cashed out by moral isolation, by con-
centrating on your own betterment and ignoring the plight of others.
One initial reason why we should take Heloise seriously as a philosopher is
that she demonstrated a keen understanding of Stoic ethics. She is, however, a
critical reader, onewho is not afraid to depart signiﬁcantly from the philosophers
she cites, even if it means going againstwhat her teacher, Abelard, also believed.
She is a creative thinkerwho is able to, using only fragments ofAristotelian phil-
osophy, construct virtue ethical arguments that she can apply to the growth of her
religious community. In this essay I mean to focus on two aspects of Heloise’s
thought which, I argue, contribute signiﬁcantly to the state of twelfth-century
ethics and bring particular insight on what kind of philosophical reﬂections
could be applied to life in a particular kind of community: the nunnery. First, I
shall argue, Heloise seems to place greater weight than some of her contempor-
aries, in particular Abelard for whom ethical goodness is achieved at the level of
intention, rather than action, on the view that virtue grows within a community,
not in isolation. She derives from the Stoics, via Seneca, a belief in the moral
value of one’s community and rejects Abelard’s belief that the road to virtue
is a lonely struggle with oneself. Secondly, Abelard appears to see the virtues
as perfect achievements rather than means between two extremes. For instance,
in an early discussion of ethics, he appears to favour abstinence over temperance,
suggesting that it is better to free oneself completely of the kind of impulses that a
temperate person is supposed to resist.8Heloise, on the other hand, seemskeen to
reinstate the Aristotelian understanding of virtue as a mean between two
extremes. In her letters, she defends the ideal of moderation against Abelard’s
calls for struggle and self-control, and in doing so, she uses the vocabulary of
the mean, in very much the same way as John of Salisbury did some years
later.9 This particular debate, of course, has great implications for Heloise’s
understanding of what the life of a religious community should be like.
7See, for example, Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius, 9, which I discuss in Section 2.
8Theologica Christiana II, 45. This is discussed in Section 3 of this paper.
9Both Heloise and John of Salisbury use ‘modus’ to refer to the mean. Cf. Policraticus 480d
and 531c, quoted in Nederman and Brickman, ‘Aristotelianism in Policraticus’, 214 and
Muckle, ‘Letter of Heloise’, 243.
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We have very few surviving texts from Heloise of Argenteuil, and,
because they are letters, some might argue that they are not philosophical
material.10 This would be quite wrong. Several philosophical texts are
written in that format, the letters of Seneca, for instance, a particularly rel-
evant analogy as Heloise quotes from them often, and seems to model her
style on them.11 Around the time the exchange between Heloise and
Abelard took place, there was a strong renewal of interest in literary
letters, brought on by readings of Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius.12 Exchanges
written in that vein were typically skillfully written, following a certain
pattern not unlike those of Seneca’s, announcing a theme and then develop-
ing it in a rhetorically sophisticated manner. These letters were often
intended for a public, and it is quite likely that the letters belonging to the
collection were not the only ones exchanged by Heloise and Abelard, but
the ones they selected for publication (ibid., 88). Their audience would no
doubt have recognized the letters as belonging to the genre of philosophical
letters on friendship, and would not have mistaken them for personal love
letters.13 One obvious disparity between Heloise’s letters and those of
Seneca is that Seneca was writing to Lucilius as an older man to a
younger one, and as a teacher to a student. Heloise is both younger than
Abelard and was in her youth taught by him. But that does not give the
whole picture. At the time she is writing, Heloise is a mature woman who
has become a successful abbess, whereas Abelard is an older man without
a job and no prospect in his career either as a teacher or a monk. She
may well feel that writing to him as a friend and a philosopher is not entirely
beyond what her status permits. Indeed, that she feels she can initiate a cor-
respondence in which she casts herself in the role of Seneca suggests that she
must have some conﬁdence that Abelard will welcome the chance to corre-
spond with her as one philosopher to another. The ﬁrst two letters debate the
nature of love, and the responsibilities which come with any relationship of
love or caring.14 Her third letter is more impersonal. She asks Abelard that he
write a rule for the convent of the Paraclete, where she is abbess. It is clear
from the way she formulates the demand, outlining several difﬁculties she
has considered, giving examples of why the existing rules will not do, and
10There is little or no doubt about the authenticity of the letters I am discussing here. Doubts
have been raised, of course, but they were put to rest ﬁrmly by Marenbon’s review of the
various arguments in 1997, 82–93, and in Wheeler, Listening to Heloise.
11For how Heloise models her letters on Seneca’s see Irvine, ‘Heloise and the Gendering of the
Literate Subject’. Henry West also points out that all we have left of Epicurus is of epistolary
nature, and this does not stop us from regarding him as an important philosopher, ‘Including
Women in Ancient and Medieval Philosophies’, x.
12Irvine, ‘Heloise and the Gendering of the Literate Subject’, 90.
13Indeed, one thirteenth century editor chose to collect the letters of Abelard and Heloise
together with those of Seneca, see Irvine, ‘Heloise and the Gendering of the Literate
Subject’, 90.
14This is discussed by Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, 300, and Andrea Nye, ‘A
Woman’s Thought of A Man’s Discipline’, 7.
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arguing against a universal rule which does not have the potential to mould
itself to individual needs, that she is not simply asking Abelard to draft a
document as he sees ﬁt, but she is trying to engage him in a philosophical
discussion as to how communal life should be ruled. It is not clear that
Abelard understood her request as such, as his reply is rather didactic, and
fails to take into account her discussion of the place of moderation in the
good life and good rule – although he takes some of her points very seriously
indeed, and matches her request for a better education of novices before they
have to take vows with the requirement that she should teach her nuns Latin,
Greek and Hebrew.15 Another thing that may conﬁrm our suspicion that
Heloise was after a philosophical exchange rather than a rule written for
her is the fact that Abelard’s written rule did not become the rule of the
convent of the Paraclete. Instead, Heloise wrote her own, based on some
of Abelard’s suggestions, but mostly her own thoughts about what such a
rule should be, as spelled out in her last letter to Abelard.
2. OIKEIOSIS, SENECA ON CROWDS, FRIENDSHIP, VIRTUE
AND THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY
In this section, I argue that Stoic ethics is not as distinct from Aristotelian
virtue ethics as is sometimes assumed, and that its strong social dimension,
as formulated by Seneca, was noticed and put to good use by Heloise.
In his letters to his friend Lucilius, Seneca seeks to exemplify the good
stoic life, by sharing reﬂections, anecdotes, quotes from Epicurus and
others, and arguments. In the VIIth letter he argues that crowds should be
avoided, that they are damaging to the good character. He describes going
to some lunchtime games, and witnessing the slaughtering of gladiators,
armed with nothing to protect themselves, for the entertainment of the spec-
tators. Horriﬁed by the crowd’s enthusiastic response to this unjust treatment
of criminals who should have been hung, but not butchered for entertain-
ment, Seneca writes that ‘vice is catching’, and that no-one, not even
Socrates is totally immune to the movements of the crowd, so that somebody
whose moral character is not yet ﬁrm had better avoid them altogether. We
all have to work on our character, he says, and we need calm and peace to do
so. But even one individual can create a disturbance in what we have
achieved with ourselves, a rich neighbour can make us envious, someone
who is mean-minded can lead us to have mean thoughts. He concludes
15Latin was of course fairly commonly read in the monastic milieu, but Greek and Hebrew
were extremely rare, but because Heloise knew them, Abelard suggested she passes on that
knowledge to the nuns she was responsible for, because, he said, it might be useful in inter-
preting religious texts. See Ziolkowski, Letters of Peter Abelard, 23–4 and Johnson, Equal in
Monastic Profession, 46.
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with quotes praising the life that is lived for few or even just one person, in
opposition to the life lived for the masses.
Having read this letter, one could be forgiven for thinking that Seneca
believed that the good life had to be led away from the public, that one
could only achieve and maintain virtue if one was alone, or with very few
people whom one could trust not to set a bad example. But on closer
reading, one sees that this is not what Seneca has in mind. The example
he picks is a rather extreme one – not all public gatherings are necessarily
vice inducing, in fact, he had expected the one he describes to be different,
to be entertaining but not a meaningless display of violence – otherwise he
would presumably not have gone. He also makes it clear that this sort of
entertainment is new, and that previously spectators may have expected
something more enlightening. Almost certainly, he would not feel the
same way about a Greek theatrical festival. But the extreme character of
his example allows him to illustrate the point that if he, an old man and a
stoic, is shaken in his character when he attends such events, those who
are younger and less well trained than him do not stand much of a chance
of coming out unharmed. For those individuals the advice seems to be:
keep your community small, if you want to grow – mixing with others
will impede your right development.
But turn to the ninth letter, and it becomes clear that even this cannot be
Seneca’s meaning or that at the very least, this is a dubious interpretation
of it. A wise man is self-sufﬁcient, Seneca says, yet he wants friends,
neighbours, associates, a wife, and children. Being content with oneself
sufﬁces for a happy life, but not for life itself. Those who believe that
the sage will never seek the help or company of others but isolate
himself from the world are mistaken: ‘The wise man is self-sufﬁcient’.
This phrase, my dear Lucilius, is incorrectly explained by many. For
they withdraw the wise man from the world and force him to dwell
within his own skin ((Ep. IX, 13) 51). The need of the self-sufﬁcient
sage for others is not so much a mark of their frailty, but so that they
may exercise the virtue of friendship (18Ep. IX, 8).16 Self-sufﬁciency,
even when coupled with a clear awareness of the dangers of company,
does not mean taking oneself out of the world and living ‘in one’s own
skin’. Seneca is very aware that good life is lived in the world, and
that it requires developing a number of appropriate relationships within
one’s community. His understanding of what it means to be human is
really, in that sense at least, not that different from that of the Greeks:
a human being ﬂourishes not in isolation but as part of a couple, a
family, a circle of friends, and a political community.
The idea that the stoic sage can live in the world and at the same time be
self-sufﬁcient is perhaps best understood within the context of that elusive
16The text reads ‘ne tam magna virtus’ which I translate as referring to friendship itself, rather
than, as in the Loeb translation, to the virtues of the wise man in general. See Seneca 46 and 47.
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stoic notion: oikeiosis. Central to the stoic conception of moral development
(how does that young man eventually become a sage?) oikeiosis is a natural
process whereby one extends one’s natural tendencies to self-preservation to
an impartial concern for all.17 Oikeiosis is hard to translate.18 One could say
that it is a sort of making oneself at home in the world, ﬁrst in one’s own
body, then one’s environment: a sort of coming to belong. Animals and
young children are capable of the early stages of the process – that of recog-
nizing their own bodies as belonging to them, and learning how to use them
for their own survival. Mature animals are also able to engage in later stage
of oikeiosis, that of caring for their young. Human oikeiosis starts as it does
with animals, but goes further due to human rationality.
Hierocles in a fragment from his Elements of Ethics gives us a vivid image
of what oikeiosis looks like, one that was part of orthodox stoicism, and
therefore, traces of which we might well expect to ﬁnd in the later Roman
stoics19:
Each one of us is as it were entirely encompassed by many circles, some
smaller, others larger, the latter enclosing the former on the basis of their
different and unequal dispositions relative to each other. The ﬁrst and
closest circle is the one which a person has drawn as though around a
centre, his own mind. This circle encloses the body and anything taken for
the sake of the body. For it is virtually the smallest circle, and almost
touches the centre itself. Next, the second one further removed from the
centre but enclosing the ﬁrst circle; this contains parents, siblings, wife, and
children. The third one has in it uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews,
nieces, and cousins. The next circle includes the other relatives, and this is fol-
lowed by the circle of local residents, then the circle of fellow-tribesmen, next
that of fellow citizens, and then in the same way the circle of people from
neighboring towns, and the circle of fellow-countrymen. The outermost and
largest circle, which encompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human
race. Once all these have been surveyed, it is the task of a well tempered
man, in his proper treatment of each group, to draw the circles together
somehow towards the centre, and to keep zealously transferring those from
the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones … It is incumbent on us to
respect people from the third circle as if they were those from the second,
and again to respect our other relatives as if they were those from the third
17Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 265.
18Long, ‘Greek Ethics after MacIntyre’, suggests ‘self-ownership’ which includes self-recog-
nition and self-love, 250–63. On oikeiosis see also Gisela Striker, The Role of Oikeiosis in
Stoic Ethics; Christopher Gill, ‘Did Galen Understand Platonic and Stoic Thinking on
Emotions?’.
19Seneca, although he does not refer to this passage speciﬁcally, uses the image of concentric
circles in ep. 12.5, to discuss the passing of time. The fact that the image was still present in
Stoic writings suggests that Hierocles’ text had been inﬂuential. See Ker, The Deaths of
Seneca, 336–41, for a discussion of Seneca and the use of the concentric circle image in
Roman literature.
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circle. […] The right point will be reached if, through our own initiative, we
reduce the distance of the relationship with each person.
(Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 56G)
Stoic moral development consists in bringing all those circles together, i.e.
making one’s perception of oneself ﬁt the last of those circles. The self
thus grows from a lone disembodied soul, an infant who cannot recognize
her own hands, let alone her mother, to a child learning to use her body to
survive, and to look after her physical well-being, but who also loves her
family, to a young person who has friends, neighbours, associates, and to
a mature individual who sees herself as one human being among others,
and who recognizes the value of humanity wherever it may be, and
however well developed it may be. Thus, the Stoic sage, like Seneca does
in letter forty-seven, can claim to eat at table with his slaves, as they are
just as human as he is, and their company is nothing to be ashamed of.
I am glad to learn, through those who come from you, that you live on friendly
terms with your slaves. This beﬁts a sensible and well-educated man like your-
self. ‘They are slaves,’ people declare. Nay, rather they are men. ‘Slaves!’ No,
comrades. ‘Slaves!’ No, they are unpretentious friends. ‘Slaves!’ No, they are
our fellow-slaves, if one reﬂects that Fortune has equal rights over slaves and
free men alike.
(300–3)
He goes on to recommend that masters should share their table with slaves,
as they would with friends or family, that is, not hold out an open invitation
to all of one’s slaves – but those whose company we value, just as we would
invite some of our neighbours but not all. Again, the emphasis is not merely
on respect of humanity in an abstract fashion – although there is that too –
but on friendship that results in social interaction in the actual world. A
twelfth-century philosopher who, like Heloise, knew the letters well,
would not necessarily have believed that a wise person had to be cut off
from the world, but, if she understood oikeiosis in the manner I have
suggested was correct, one should ﬁnd the right way of engaging with
one’s community, this interaction being an essential part of one’s develop-
ment.20 And even when that development is complete and one has achieved
the heights of wisdom, the twelfth-century stoic may understand the impor-
tance of practising one’s virtues through friendship.
Abelard’s own ethics, with its emphasis on the moral priority of intentions is
perhaps more of an isolationist model.21 Indeed, in theCollationes, he goes so far
as to claim that acts themselves are indifferent, that is, they have no moral value
20See Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 152.
21See Marenbon and Orlandi, Peter Abelard, 210.
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positive or negative, and that all the value is carried by the intention. Even when
Abelard considers the ideal moral community, that is, that republic of Plato
understood as a sort of convent for married couples, he requests that the citizens
should observe abstinence, thereby seriously limiting their interactions.22 For
Abelard, moral goodness is very much a property of one’s internal landscape
rather than of one’s interaction with one’s community. If there is any activity
involved, it is a struggle with oneself, with one’s body, but never an effort to
ﬁt in with the world, to make a good life for oneself and others within the com-
munity.23 But this is not what we gather from Heloise’s own writings. She does
want to focus on the life of her community. Her ﬁrst letters are concerned with
trying to make sense, not of her feelings, not of her internal landscape, but of the
situation she ﬁnds herself in: what has she done wrong? How can she make her
life without Abelard, and in seclusion, tolerable? In her ﬁrst letter, Heloise
encourages Abelard to share his troubles not just with herself, but with the
entire convent, because ‘A community of grief can bring some comfort to one
in need of it, since many shoulders lighten any burden or even make it seem
to disappear’.24 She thus proposes that managing our emotions – a central
stoic concern if ever there was one – is best achieved through community
engagement. The solution to Abelard’s suffering is not to retire, alone, and
build a wall around himself while he struggles with his feelings to make them
disappear, but to open himself up and request help from the community that con-
siders him as their father (Abelard founded their convent and instituted himself as
their spiritual advisor), so that they may help him by sharing his burden.
In her last letter, having promised Abelard not to dwell anymore on her
feelings and her dissatisfaction with her fate, she chooses to focus not on
her inner landscape, and how to make it more pleasing to God, but on the
organization of life within the convent. How can she and her nuns, together,
lead a good and fruitful life? Is it possible to replace rules that hamper their
progress, with new ones that favour the qualities and strengths that stem from
their speciﬁc nature? This interest in improving the communal life of the
nuns by choosing better suited activities for them may seem out of line
with the idea that the point of convent life was simply to hide oneself
from the world and be closer to God. When Peter the Venerable, writing
to Heloise and expressing his wishes that she would come to Cluny, near
him, or the ‘joyous prison of Marcigny’ nearby, the picture he offers of
convent life is a rather more passive one:
You would watch young girls of God, stolen as it were from Satan and the
world, erecting high walls of virtue on the bedrock of their innocence and
22Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, 245 and 306. I will discuss Abelard’s take on
Plato’s ideal city in the next section.
23See Marenbon and Orlandi, Peter Abelard, 129–30.
24Levitan, Abelard and Heloise, 51; Muckle, ‘The Personal Letters Between Abelard and
Heloise’, 68. This passage echoes one in Seneca’s in which he claims that true friends
‘have all things in common, especially their troubles’ 6.3.
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raising to the very heights of heaven the rooftop of a blessed ediﬁce. Your
heart would smile to see them ﬂower in angelic chastity in company with
the most virtuous of widows, and all of them alike awaiting the glory of
that great and blessed resurrection, their bodies enclosed so snugly in their
houses as if already in a tomb of blessed hope.
(Levitan, Abelard and Heloise, 269. Constable, The Letters of
Peter the Venerable, v1, ep.115, 306)
The nuns of Marcigny are portrayed as reclining, as in a grave, waiting for
death to take them. Heloise, though she may disapprove of certain forms
of activity and participation for her nuns, such as working the harvest,
does not recommend that they should be inactive, but that work more
suited to their strengths and nature be found. Similarly, though she suggests
that the duty of hospitality should not be imposed on her nuns, the justiﬁca-
tion she offers is not that nuns should never see any outsiders, but that they
should avoid the risks presented by the dining and wining together with male
guests.
Then what does it imply for a convent of women that the abbot himself is
required to read the lesson from the Gospel before proceeding to the hymn?
And what about the abbot’s table where he is required to dine with pilgrims
and guests? Will either be suitable for our religious practice – that an
abbess never offer hospitality to men, or that she sits and takes her meals
with her male guests?
(Levitan, Abelard and Heloise, 107; Muckle, ‘Letter of Heloise’, 243)
Both Abelard’s proposed rule for the Paraclete, and Peter the Venerable’s
description of the nuns at Cluny suggest that nuns were expected to be clois-
tered, cut off from the world both in the sense that they should not have visi-
tors or leave the convent themselves. Indeed, it seems as though Heloise
herself is requesting something of the sort when she tells Abelard that enter-
taining guests over dinner is a risk she does not wish her nuns to take. But
such cloistering was not very closely observed and nuns typically did go in
and out of their convent homes to work with the community, or take part in
religious business in different places.25 Even without leaving the convent,
however, nuns were exposed to communal life, at least as much as a
person living outside a convent would be, simply because they lived
together, and because, if they were to avoid too many outsiders, they had
to organize the necessities of their survival themselves. A convent was in
some ways a small polis, with its own government – the Abbess – and
25Johnson, Equal in Monastic Profession, observes: ‘If we put clerical theory and legislation
to one side, however, we can see that the nunnery walls served communities as permeable
membranes rather than watertight seals. Neither active nor passive cloistering was absolute:
religious women commonly left their houses on all sorts of errands, and those who were
not community members entered the monastery precincts on all sorts of pretexts.’ 152.
676 SANDRINE BERGES
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:5
0 2
0 M
ay
 20
14
 
with each of its members having a speciﬁc role to play. It seems therefore
that nuns – and indeed monks – would have been in an especially good
position to understand that virtue had to be developed within a social
context.26 As a woman in charge of a group of women living together
and interacting, as a group, with the outside world, whether it be those
who lived on the land they owned, or the church ofﬁcials they dealt with
when they needed to expand, Heloise would have been well aware of the
impossibility of divorcing virtue from one’s interaction with various
communities.
3. MODERATION, EQUITY AND THE CONVENT RULE
As I suggested in my introduction, Heloise’s reading of Seneca is not uncri-
tical. She departs from him radically on the question of moderation. In his
Letter 85, Seneca attempts to refute the Peripatetics’ claim that the happy
life is best achieved through moderation: ‘This halfway ground (mediocri-
tas) is accordingly misleading and useless’, he concludes. Would we seek
a middle point as far as good health was concerned? (Ep. 85.9, 290 and
291).27 And if not, why suppose that this would be desirable as far as
virtue is concerned? (Ep.85.9 and 85.4.). This rejection of the Greek’s
idea of moderation is also to be found in the writings of Augustine who
deﬁnes temperance as the pulling out and destroying of the ‘lower’ desires
(De Musica, VI, xv, 50 and De Continentia, 2). Abelard, in his early
ethical writings at least, seems to follow the same road as Seneca and Augus-
tine, reading the same interpretation of the virtue of temperance, that is,
stripped of moderation, back into the Greeks, attributing to them the ideals
of (sexual) self-restraint and even abstinence:
[The philosophers] set up (in the way commended by the Gospels) a life of
sexual self-denial (continentium vitam), both for married couples and for
the rulers, when they set out a plan for life in the cities as if they were convents
for married couples, and when they deﬁned how the rulers of those republics
should behave, and when they exempliﬁed in themselves the life of sexual
26This is something that appears to have escaped the notice of some philosophers and theologians
of the twelfth century who concentrated instead on the ‘inner motives of moral agents’. Laemers,
Claustrum Animae, 128. In that paper, Laemers discusses primarily the theological virtue of
caritas, showing how Hugh of Folieto’s Claustrum Animae presents it as a social virtue. Thus it
cannot be argued that there is only a conﬂict between internal and external virtue because we
are talking about different kinds of virtues, i.e. theological virtue on the one hand, and ethical
virtue on the other, where it makes sense to think of the one as internal and the other as socially
oriented.
27Seneca’s use of ‘mediocritas’ is echoed by Boethius’s translation of ‘tou metrion’ as ‘med-
iocris’ in the Topics 107a11–13. Cf. Nederman and Brickman, ‘Aristotelianism in Policrati-
cus’, 212.
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self-denial and abstinence (continentium atque abstinentium) which now is
followed by clerics and monks.
(Theologia Christiana, II.45. tr. Marenbon, The Philosophy of
Peter Abelard, 306)28
It is interesting that although Abelard is talking about the continent individ-
ual, he does not use ‘temperantia’ to describe him, but talks, rather, of absti-
nence. Both Heloise and Abelard were familiar with Cicero’s De Inventione
in which he deﬁnes temperance as the ﬁrm and moderate (ﬁrma et moderata)
control of sexual and other problematic instincts through reason (De Inven-
tione, II, 164).
From this deﬁnition, Abelard retains the focus on the sexual, but drops mod-
eration altogether. For him, as for Augustine, what matters is that we should be
ﬁrm with our sexual instincts, that we should uproot them altogether if we can –
there is nothing moderate about that. Both Heloise and Abelard would also have
been familiar with Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. In the Categories and the
Topics, available to them through Boethius, they would have read Aristotle’s
exhortations that we should avoid excess (superabundantia) and seek the
mean (mediocres) in order to become virtuous.29
In her third letter, in which she agrees to stop writing about her personal,
emotional and spiritual struggles, as they disturb Abelard, Heloise asks that
they can together come up with a rule for her convent. The rationale behind
this request is that the existing (Benedictine) rule, written for men, cannot be
applied to nuns without creating unnecessary discomfort and practical difﬁculties.
Marenbon sees this call for moderation as one for consolation and help in bearing
what Heloise sees as her – and by extension all women’s – essential weakness
(Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, 311). She cannot simply strive
to become more virtuous, she is incapable of earning a ‘victor’s crown’ by
going to war against herself, or to earn more than the ‘corner of heaven God
places me in’.30 For Marenbon, Heloise is simply calling Abelard back to
reality, pointing out to him that for most people, perfection is not a realistic
goal, and that they need help dealing with hardships and difﬁculties, especially
if they are living as recluse in a convent. I disagree with his assessment, and I
believe that there is more philosophical content in Heloise’s arguments.
It may help perhaps to clarify the context of the passages Marenbon refers
to. True, Heloise is asking for consolation, she is asking for help coping with
convent life, and she is asking Abelard that he not see her as stronger than
28It must be noted that this is a relatively early text and that Abelard is more concerned in that
text with showing that ancient doctrines were not incompatible with Christianity. Perhaps,
therefore one ought to accuse him of vagueness rather than misunderstanding.
29This is discussed by Nederman and Brickmann, ‘Aristotelianism in Policraticus’, 212. In
that article, the authors argue that John of Salisbury embraced this and other ethical doctrines
of Aristotle, long before the rediscovery of the Ethics. Indeed, Abelard wrote his own com-
menrary on the Categories. Marenbon, Boethius, 167.
30See full quote on p. 679.
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she is. But there is an unmistakable ring of conﬁdence to her writing that does
not chime well with a literal interpretation of these demands. The letters are
clearly written by somebody who is not short of resources that would help her
cope with a secluded life. Moreover, although she and her nuns almost certainly
did need external help in setting themselves up, and securing even the bare
necessities of convent life – purchasing food and clothing, acquiring bibles
and other religious texts, dealing with the monks who said mass and gave
them communion, organizing their rites - she is not quite as helpless as it may
seem from those letters. Heloise was in fact a highly capable abbess who was
extraordinarily successful in expanding her abbey (acquiring several sister
houses) and educating her nuns (she taught them Greek and Hebrew). So we
should take her pleas for help with a pinch of salt, perhaps. But one thing she
may have needed from Abelard, that she could not easily ﬁnd anywhere else,
within or without the convent, was an interlocutor, someone who was her
equal, and with whom she could engage in the kind of intellectual and philoso-
phical exchange that she craved. So when in the ﬁfth letter, she agrees to stop
talking about her emotional turmoil, and asks instead that he write for her a
convent rule, she is not merely asking him to produce a document, as he sees
ﬁt. She is asking him to engage with and respond to some thoughts she puts
forward on the good life in general, and the religious life in particular. These
thoughts include a wider view of what it means to be virtuous which seems to
be in almost direct conﬂict with the view put forward by Abelard earlier.
Heloise ﬁrst takes issue with Abelard’s conception of virtue in the third
letter:
Do not talk to me of strength, or ﬁghting the good ﬁght. Do not tell me that
power is made perfect by weakness, and that no one is crowned who does
not strive. I seek no crown of victory – enough that I keep from risk, far
safer to keep from risk than to keep struggling in these wars. Whatever
corner of heaven God may grant will ﬁt me well enough.
(Levitan, Abelard and Heloise, 83; Muckle, ‘The Personal Letters Between
Abelard and Heloise’, 82)
Heloise has no interest in extreme virtue, she does not wish to wage war
against herself or compete for a crown, but will be satisﬁed with safety
from vice and ‘any corner of heaven’ God chooses to grant her. For
Abelard, virtue is a struggle with oneself, a competition, and a journey
that has a clear completion: once you have succeeded, you are crowned,
and you go to heaven. Although he did greatly admire the ancients, we
saw that he followed Augustine and Seneca in preferring virtue to be free
of moderation.31 I believe that much of what Heloise does in her third
31See Bejczy, The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages, 137, Marenbon, The Philosophy of
Peter Abelard, 284–7, and Mews, Abelard and Heloise, 106 for discussions of Abelard’s
admirative, but also mixed attitude to pagan virtue.
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letter is to propose a revision of Abelard’s conception of virtue, one that is
more in tune with ancient theories. What this means is that whether she
refers to her own weakness, or that of women in general, or even weakness
of the age, she is not asking Abelard to be more realistic about what she and
others can hope to achieve, but trying to persuade him to reinstate the ideal of
moderation. To be moderate involves a certain amount of caution which is
not necessarily compatible with a constant struggle for perfection. It also
involves a recognition of all aspects of what it means to be a human
being, and a respect for one’s humanity which entails that one should take
seriously the demands of the body and of human emotions.
The request for a rule is phrased as follows. Heloise asks Abelard on
behalf of the nuns of the Paraclete is that he should:
institute a rule for us to follow, a written directive suitable for women, detail-
ing in full the condition and habit of our own way of life. This has not been
done by any of the fathers, and because of this failure, it is now the case
that both men and women are received into monasteries to profess the same
rule, and the same yoke of monastic regulation is laid upon the stronger and
the weaker sex alike.
(Levitan, Abelard and Heloise, 106–7; Muckle, ‘Letter of Heloise’, 242)
She adds of the Benedictine rule, which she has attempted to follow, that ‘as
this rule was written only for men, its instructions can be followed only by
men’.
A series of examples follows. The Benedictine rule speciﬁes how many
pieces of clothing of each kind a monk should have. These, however, Heloise
points out, are men’s clothes, so this rule is useless for women. Moreover, Ben-
edict recommends that monks wear the woollen clothes directly, i.e. with no
underwear. But this is hardly practical, she says, for women who are having
their period. Other aspects of the rule which are hard for women to implement
are that of hospitality – nuns cannot easily welcome men guests at dinner – and
working the harvest – for various reasons, it is harder for nuns to go about
outside the convent, and in any case, frowned upon. One amusing example
she gives is related to wine: women, she says, quoting Aristotle, can drink
more than men without getting drunk, thanks to the monthly ‘purgation’ of
their body. Therefore, we need not limit the quantities of wine they are
allowed to drink in the same degree as we limit the monks.
The examples above might give the impression that Heloise is merely
concerned with solving a few practical issues. It is certainly true that she
takes as her ﬁrst premise her observation that all is not well in the practical
arrangements made for the nuns of her convent. However that is far from
being all that she is doing and the import of her discussion is both philo-
sophical – she is asking Abelard to take the ideal of moderation more
seriously – and applied in a more signiﬁcant manner – a central argument
she makes is that nuns need to receive a decent education before they take
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their vows. Her observation of the shortcomings of the arrangements in
place for her nuns is followed by a statement of the philosophical impor-
tance of moderation in virtue:
If discretion is the mother of all virtues and reason the mediator of all good,
can something be a virtue or a good which seems so at odds with discretion
and with reason? Virtues that exceed the mean should be counted among
the vices, Jerome says.
(Levitan, Abelard and Heloise, 109; Muckle, ‘Letter of Heloise’, 243)32
This passage is a direct rebuttal of Abelard: if something is not a mean
between two extremes, she says, but instead is itself an extreme, then it
cannot be a virtue.33 The rule itself must be moderated according to the
rule maker’s perception of his or her subjects’ capacities. A rule that
ignores what can and cannot be done, and the circumstances in which some-
thing can be done either well or poorly is not a good rule. This attitude she
observes, is not absent from the spirit of the Benedictine rule.
Saint Benedict himself was consistently aware of the importance of careful
distinctions, steeped as he was in the spirit of all things just. In fact, he tem-
pered everything in the Rule to suit the character of the person involved and
the season of the year, and in one passage concluded, ‘Let all things be done in
moderation’. Beginning with the abbot himself, he instructed him to preside
over his subordinates ‘according to the character and understanding of each,
adjusting and adapting himself to all in such a way that he may not only
suffer no loss in his ﬂock, but may even rejoice in its increase’, and later con-
tinued: Let him always keep his own frailty before his eyes and remember not
to break the bruised reed … Let him be discreet and moderate (discernat et
temperet), bearing in mind the discretion of Jacob, who said, ‘If I should
cause my ﬂocks to be overdriven, in one day they all will die.’ Following
this and other examples of discretion, the mother of virtues, he should
temper all things in a way that the strong may have something to strive for
and the weak may not be discouraged.
(Levitan, Abelard and Heloise, 110; Muckle, ‘Letter of Heloise’, 244)
Frailty, she says, quoting Benedict, is not something to be fought, to be over-
come, but to be observed and taken into consideration when devising a
course of action. ‘Do not break the bruised reed’, always be moderate and
bear in mind the character and intelligence of those you rule, before instruct-
ing them. These comments are not just concerned with moderation, but also
32Sed et cum omnium virtutum discretio sit mater, et omnium bonum moderatrix sit ratio, quis
aut virtutem aut bonum censeat quod ab istis dissentire videat? Ipsas quippe virtutes exce-
dentes modum atque mensuram, sicut Hieronimus asserit, inter vitia reputari convenit.
33The use of Jerome here is clever, as so many of Abelard’s own prescriptions are drawn from
Jerome. See Bussell in Wheeler, Listening to Heloise, 246 for a discussion of this passage and
its impact.
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with the particularistic nature of virtue. How one goes about acquiring a par-
ticular virtue depends on one’s existing nature. Courage is not exempliﬁed
by the same course of action in the young and ﬁt on the one hand and the
old and frail on the other. Nor will it be the same in those who are by
nature shy or timid, and those whose instinct is to run in the face of
danger. The mean has to be found for each individual according to the
instincts they have to moderate.
It is in this context that we must read Heloise’s references to the weak-
ness of women: she is simply trying to extend the equitable conception of
pastoral care that Benedict seems to have adopted to women as well as
men. Though she refers on several occasions to women’s weakness, the
examples of difference she gives seem to be down to physical constitution
(women bleed once a month, men do not and women can drink without fear
of getting drunk, but men cannot, men can engage in more demanding
physical labour than women) or socially imposed behaviour (women
cannot wear men’s clothing, they cannot entertain men at dinner without
being perceived as ﬂirting with them, and unchaperoned women cannot
work in the ﬁelds).34 To apply a rule which was meant to be equitable to
a group of people who have a number of signiﬁcant characteristics
without seeking to change any aspect of the rule goes against its spirit,
she says.
Moreover, it goes against the spirit of virtue to seek to impose a mode of
behaviour on people when their character is not suited to receive it. A nun
attempting to behave in a way that is speciﬁcally suited for a man will not
be virtuous. If she attempts to use her body beyond its natural capacities,
resulting in injury and the inability to perform necessary tasks later, she
will not be virtuous. If she ﬂaunts what is socially acceptable for women,
shocking people and attracting unwanted attention, without any justiﬁcation
other than the desire to follow a law written for monks, again, she will not be
virtuous.35 Such behaviour is excessive, and excess is a characteristic of
vice, not virtue. Obeying the law may be virtuous, but failing to see that
there are circumstances in which the universal character of the law fails to
accommodate successfully the particulars of the situation is to be blind in
a way that a virtuous person is not supposed to be – it is a failure of the
ﬁne judgement which is supposed to be typical of the virtuous person. Simi-
larly, a rule giver who does not take into account the particular characteristic
of his or her subjects when writing laws and who does not allow for the
34Andrea Nye argues that although Heloise starts off discussing the weakness of women, she
moves on to questioning ‘any moral order based on law, commands and obedience’ (A
Woman’s Thought of A Man’s Discipline, 10). My own claim, slightly weaker, is that like
Plato and Aristotle, Heloise points to the need of supplementing law with equity.
35This is not to say that one could not behave in that very way for different reasons, to shock
people into reﬂecting on gender questions, to challenge their prejudices, or even to prove a
point about shortcomings of the existing rule.
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practice of equity, i.e. ruling against the law when the circumstances clearly
demand it, is not a good ruler.
Those arguments could almost be directly lifted from Aristotle’s Rhetoric,
and his views on equity, or, equally, from Plato’s Statesman, and his argu-
ment that an ideal ruler would sit by each subject, and assess his or her
needs in terms of his or her character, and prescribe a rule of conduct accord-
ingly. Heloise was almost certainly not familiar with those texts, however,
we know that the arguments of the ancients had found their way to Medieval
scholarship, through various commentaries.36 In particular, Seneca and
Cicero’s account of clementia is at times very reminiscent of Aristotelian
equity. In De Inventione, Cicero describes clementia as a part of temperance,
though he sees it as moderation through courtesy of the hatred one may feel
for someone.37 Seneca, in his infamous discussion of young Nero’s clemency,
on the other hand, does make clementia sound something like equity, the exer-
cise of mercy when particular circumstances justify it, or when it seems that
strict application of the law would have unjust consequences.38 In fact, that
it depends on choice which is based on the recognition of individual character-
istics of a situation, rather than plain duty, is exactly what makes it a virtue.
Equity is about helping each individual achieving virtue in the best way they
can, taking into account that we are all different, and therefore likely to
respond best to slightly different treatments.
While Heloise is certainly concerned with making the life of her nuns more
comfortable as well as more religiously correct – in particular she does not see
the need of pointlessly punishing the body by engaging in practices that were
designed for people of different physical nature – her arguments take us much
further than that. Part of what she is saying is that a person’s nature should be
prepared to receive the religious rule. She is not simply thinking that we all
have slightly different natures, different strengths, but that our nature and
strengths are not properly realized unless we have received a certain degree
of education. She asks whether it is sensible to
test the constancy of the women we accept through the probation of just a
single year? Or to instruct them with just three readings of the Rule, as the
36Cicero’s De Inventione, and Macrobius’ Comentarii in Somnium Scipionis being the most
frequent references to ancient theories on the virtues, Becjczy, in Becjczy and Newhauser,
2. Reading Heloise’s quotation from Jerome, it is hard to believe that Jerome himself was
not familiar with Aristotle’s theory of the virtues – again, perhaps not directly, but at the
very least through other writers.
37
‘Clementia, per quam animi temere in odium alicuius iniectionis concitati comitate retine-
dur’, II, 164.
38It is probably this understanding of clementia which has led Syme, Tacitus, 338, to claim
that clementia was not a virtue because it depended on choice and whim, not duty. Fuhrmann,
Die Alleinherrschaft und das Problem der Gerechtigkeit, suggested that clementia was best
understood as derived from the legal concept of aequitas, the principle of particular justice.
See also Konczol, ‘Clemency and Justice’ for a discussion of the legal elements of De
Clementia.
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Rule itself prescribes? What can be more foolish than entering on a path that is
both unknown and as yet unexplained? Is there any more presumptuous act
than committing yourself to a way of life you do not know or taking vows
you have no capacity to fulﬁll?
(Levitan, Abelard and Heloise, 109; Muckle, ‘Letter of Heloise’, 243)
She is referring to the typical convents’ recruitment policy. Nuns would of
course start off as novices, and then after a year, take the vows. The only
‘instruction’ they would receive beforehand was three readings of the
Rule.39 None of this, Heloise says, is sufﬁcient to ensure that the recruits
know what they are embarking on and are in a position to fulﬁl their role
once they have taken the vows. This is not, it seems, an argument that
applies only to women, but Heloise appears to be questioning the Benedic-
tine rule itself. No-one should commit themselves to spending the rest of
their lives in a convent or monastery who does not understand what it
involves. A woman coming in as novice, unless she had been sent to the
convent to be educated as a child, had probably received next to no edu-
cation. And if all that was expected of her before she took her vows was
three readings of the Rule (presumably, the rule would be read out to her,
and she need not show signs of having understood), she would remain ignor-
ant throughout her life.
It is clear that Abelard pays heed to Heloise’s recommendation, and that he
has no objection to women being well educated. The Rule for the Paraclete,
as Abelard writes it in the last letter, indeed recommends that the nuns of the
Paraclete learn Greek and Hebrew as well as Latin, claiming that it will be
useful to compare translations of religious texts and that it will be easy for
them to learn as Heloise can teach them. He therefore recommends for
them an unusually high level of learning, such as would not be found in
any convent or in many monasteries. From the example of Heloise, he
sees the value of women receiving an education, both for their own sake
and for the sake of the service to the church they can then deliver. To be a
good nun is to understand sacred texts, and that cannot be done through
ignorance. Even if Abelard needs Heloise to remind him of the value of mod-
eration, he needs no such reminder when it comes to reason and knowledge.
One cannot be virtuous – and therefore contribute to the life of the convent –
if one is not educated. And that is not to be understood as merely literate, but
as having achieved a degree of excellency as close as possible to Heloise’s
own, famous as she was for her learning.
39Of course if they had been educated at the convent before entering it as a novice, things were
different. But that was not the case for all novices, and indeed, by the mid-twelfth century, the
practice of sending little girls to convents for schooling purposes was discouraged. See
McNamer, The Education of Heloise, 22.
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4. CONCLUSION: WOMEN AND VIRTUE ETHICS?
It should perhaps come as no surprise that one of the few twelfth-century phi-
losophers who took seriously the ancients’ claims about the virtuous life
being one that requires a constant adjustment of the self to the community
and of the community to the self, rather than an interiorist strict rule follow-
ing, was a woman and a nun. Even in recent years virtue ethics has held a
special appeal to women philosophers, who saw perhaps a justiﬁcation of
their own resistance to a strict application to the moral law which took no
account of the particulars of a situation, and in particular, of the relationships
involved. This is why Annette Baier, for instance, saw Gilligan’s work on
women’s moral psychology, In a Different Voice, as modern interpretation
of Aristotelian virtue ethics (‘What do Women Want in a Moral Theory’,
263).
In Heloise’s case, it is perhaps the fact that she is a professional, whose
duties involve caring for a group of nuns, which meant that her philosophical
reﬂections would turn to ethics, rather than the metaphysics she was trained
for by Abelard, and that she would have greater ease in understanding how
the Stoics had meant for their views to translate to the good life. She is
perhaps one of the ﬁrst applied ethicists (unless one counts all of the
ancient philosophers, which may not be unjustiﬁed), and interestingly, in
the light of the scorn that is sometimes poured on applied ethics, the pro-
fessional engagement of her philosophy means that she gets the detail of
the theory right when Abelard, the purely theoretical ethicist does not.
Submitted 12 June 2012, revised 25 September and 19 November,
accepted 13 December
Bilkent University
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Annas, Julia. The Morality of Happiness. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993.
Augustine. De Musica, liber VI. Jacobsson, ed. Stockholm: Almqvist &
Wiksell International, 2002.
Baier, Annette. ‘What Do Women want in a Moral Theory?’. In Virtue
Ethics, edited by Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, 262–77. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997.
Bejczy, Istvan P. The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages. Leiden: Brill,
2011.
Bussell, Donna Alfano. ‘Heloise Redressed: Rhetorical Engagement and the
Benedictine Rite of Initiation in Heloise’s Third Letter’, In Listening to
Heloise, edited by Bonnie Wheeler, 233–53. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2000.
RETHINKING TWELFTH-CENTURY VIRTUE ETHICS 685
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:5
0 2
0 M
ay
 20
14
 
Cicero. De Inventione; De Optimo Genere Oratorium; Topica. Translated by
Hubbell. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949.
Constable, G., ed. The Letters of Peter the Venerable. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1967.
Fuhrmann, M. ‘Die Alleinherrschaft und das Problem der Gerechtigkeit
(Seneca: De Clementia)’. Gymnasium 70 (1963): 481–514.
Gill, Christopher. ‘Did Galen Understand Platonic and Stoic Thinking on
Emotions?’. In The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by
Julia Sihvola and Troes Engberg-Perdersen, 113–148. Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 1993.
Irvine, Martin. ‘Heloise and the Gendering of the Literate Subject’. In
Criticism and Dissent in the Middle Ages, edited by Rita Copeland,
87–114. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Johnson, Penelope. Equal in Monastic Profession. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991.
Ker, James. The Deaths of Seneca. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Konczol, Miklos. ‘Clemency and Justice in the De Clementia of Seneca’.
Iustum Aequum Salutare IV, no. 4 (2008): 61–9.
Laemers, Jeroen. ‘Claustrum Animae: The Community as Example for
Interior Reform’. In Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century, edited
by Istvan P. Bejczy and Richard G. Newhauser, 119–32. Leiden:
Brill, 2005.
Lapidge, Michael. ‘The Stoic Inheritance’. In A History of Twelfth Century
Western Philosophy, edited by Peter Dronke, 81–112. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Levitan, William, trans. Abelard and Heloise, The Letters and Other
Writings. Indianapolis: Hacket, 2007.
Long, A. A. ‘Greek Ethics after MacIntyre and the Stoic Community of
Reason’. In Stoic Studies, edited by A. A. Long, 156–78. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1996.
Long, A.A., and David Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. London: Duckworth, 1981.
Marenbon, John. The Philosophy of Peter Abelard. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997.
Marenbon, John. Boethius. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Marenbon, John, and Giovanni Orlandi. Peter Abelard: Collationes. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2001.
McNamer, Elizabeth Mary. The Education of Heloise. Lampeter: Edwin
Mellen Press, 1991.
Mews, Constant. Abelard and Heloise. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005.
Muckle, Joseph Thomas. ‘The Personal Letters Between Abelard and
Heloise: Introduction, Authenticity and Text’. Medieval Studies 15
(1953): 47–94.
Muckle, Joseph Thomas. ‘The Letter of Heloise on Religious Life and
Abelard's First Reply’. Mediaeval Studies 17 (1955): 240–81.
686 SANDRINE BERGES
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:5
0 2
0 M
ay
 20
14
 
Nederman, Carl, and J. Brickmann. ‘Aristotelianism in John of Salisbury’s
Policraticus’. Journal of the History of Philosophy 21, no. 2 (1983):
203–29.
Nederman, Carl. ‘Beyond Stoicism and Aristotelianism: John of Salesbury’s
Skepticism and Twelfth Century Moral Philosophy’. In Virtue and
Ethics in the Twelfth Century, edited by Istvan P. Bejczy and Richard
G. Newhauser, 175–96. Leiden: Brill, 2005.
Normore, Calvin. ‘Abelard’s Stoicism and Its Consequences’. In Stoicism,
Traditions and Transformations, edited by Steven K. Strange and
Jack Zupko, 132–47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Nye, Andrea. ‘A Woman’s Thought of a Man’s Discipline?’. Hypatia 7, no.
2 (1992): 1–23.
Seneca. De Clementia. In Moral Essays, edited by I. Basore. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1928.
Seneca. Epistles. Vol, IV, V. Edited by Goold and Translated by Gunmere.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
Sihvola, and Engberg-Pedersen, eds. The Emotions in Hellenistic
Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2010.
Strange, Steven K., and Jack Zupko, eds. Stoicism, Traditions and
Transformations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Striker, Gisela. The Role of Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics. Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy, Vol. I, 145–167. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1983.
Syme, R. Tacitus. Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958.
West, Henry. ‘Including Women in Ancient and Medieval Philosophies’. In
An Unconventional History of Western Philosophy, edited by Karen
J. Warren, xi–xiii. Lanham: Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 2009.
Wheeler, Bonnie. Listening to Heloise. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2000.
Wieland, Georg. ‘The Reception of Aristotle’s Ethics’. In Cambridge
History of Late Medieval Philosophy, edited by Norman Kretzmann,
Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, 657–72. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982.
Ziolkowski, Jan. Letters of Peter Abelard: Beyond the Personal.
Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008.
RETHINKING TWELFTH-CENTURY VIRTUE ETHICS 687
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:5
0 2
0 M
ay
 20
14
 
